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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between ethnic composition, political regimes, and the
quality of public policy. Speciﬁcally, based on the citizen-candidate model, we assume individuals
who have heterogeneous policy preferences and investigate how ethnic diversity aﬀects selection
of a politician and the resulting policy choices in democratic and dictatorial regimes. In the
theoretical analysis, our model derives (1) a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and
the quality of public policy, both in a democracy with a dominant group and in a dictatorship,
and (2) a non-monotonic relationship in a democracy without a dominant group. In the empirical
examination, using health outcomes as the proxy for the quality of public policy, our theoretical
results are supported by evidence from the data of 154 countries.
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11 Introduction
The government is required to achieve security, education, and health by public policies, but the
quality of public policies across countries shows large diﬀerences. Ethnic diversity in a society can be
considered as a factor causing those diﬀerences, and the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity
and public goods provision is shown to be negative in many previous studies (e.g., Alesina et al.,
1999; Alesina et al., 2003; Easterly and Levine, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Miguel and Guberty,
2005; Vigdor, 2004). Also, more public goods are provided in a democracy than in a dictatorship
(e.g., Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Deacon, 2009; Lake and Baum,
2001; Zweifel and Navia, 2000). In spite of the abundant research, few studies examine how political
regimes aﬀect the relationship between ethnic diversity and the quality of public policy. To ﬁll this
gap in the literature, the purpose of this paper is to examine this relationship from both theoretical
and empirical viewpoints.
To analyze the relationship between ethnic composition, political regimes, and public policy,
we construct a model with the following basic features. First, we assume that the allocation of
the government budget can be targeted to a speciﬁc ethnic group. Second, there are two types of
individuals who have diﬀerent policy preferences. Type e people care only about the beneﬁts of their
own ethnic group, and type s people prefer to maximize the social welfare of the entire society. Third,
applying the citizen-candidate model (Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996), the
model endogenously determines which type of individual is selected as a politician (and, therefore,
policies are also endogenously determined).
In a democracy, all citizens can decide whether or not to run for election, and a politician
is elected from among the candidates by sincere voting. Conversely, in a dictatorship, a speciﬁc
ethnic group monopolizes political power, and only the members of this group have the right to run
for election and right to vote. Since the candidates cannot commit campaign pledges during the
election, the elected candidate will implement his/her favorite public policy. On the one hand, if a
type s person is elected, he/she would distribute public goods evenly to all the ethnic groups. On
2the other hand, a type e person would distribute public goods only to his/her own ethnic group if
elected. As a result, public goods are distributed unevenly between the politician’s ethnic group
and the others, and the social welfare is worse compared to the case in which a type s politician is
elected. Furthermore, the smaller the size of the ethnic group to which a type e politician belongs,
the worse the social welfare due to the exclusive policy by the type e politician.1
Analyzing the model, we derive the relationship between ethnic composition and social welfare
in a democracy and a dictatorship. There are two crucial channels in which ethnic composition
aﬀects the social welfare. The ﬁrst channel is the selection of a politician. Ethnic composition
aﬀects electoral outcome and policy payoﬀ. Thus, individuals’ incentive to run for election depends
on ethnic composition. The second channel is the size of the ethnic group that turns out a type e
politician. When a type e individual becomes a politician, the government’s budget is monopolized
by his/her ethnic group, and the size of the group aﬀects the social welfare. We derive a negative
relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the social welfare in a dictatorship and a democ-
racy with a dominant group, which is deﬁned as a group where type e individuals within the group
make up a majority of the whole society. In a democracy without a dominant group, we derive a
non-monotonic relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the social welfare.
In the empirical analysis to examine the predictions obtained from the model, we employ health
outcomes as the proxy for the social welfare resulting from public policy. This proxy is used for the
following reasons. First, the health of the citizens is improved/maintained mainly by public goods
provision (public hospitals, water and sewage service, vaccination, sanitation and so on). Second,
since many ethnically diverse countries are located in the world’s poor regions, such as Sub-Saharan
Africa, the health status of their citizens can appropriately represent the countries’ social welfare
status as well as or better than income. Thus, infant mortality, child mortality, and life expectancy
can be considered as important indices for welfare.2 Third, although some studies use the share
of government expenditure to gross domestic product (GDP) as the proxy for the quality of public
1Our model evaluates the social welfare by the policy payoﬀ function of the type s, as described later.
2The infant mortality rate is especially high among poor people (Gwatkin et al., 2007) and can be used as one of
the indices measuring the poverty level.
3policy, there can be a gap between expenditure and actual provision in corrupt countries, as pointed
out by Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008).3
The following three testable predictions from our theoretical model are empirically tested. (1) In
a democracy with a dominant group, an increase in ethnic fractionalization worsens the health out-
comes. (2) In a democracy without a dominant group, an increase in ethnic fractionalization has a
non-monotonic eﬀect on the health outcomes. Speciﬁcally, when fractionalization is not suﬃciently
high, the health outcomes become worse as fractionalization increases. When fractionalization is
suﬃciently high, the health outcomes are good. (3) In a dictatorship, an increase in ethnic frac-
tionalization worsens the health outcomes. The regression analysis using the data of 154 countries
from 1960 to 2005 supports the above three predictions. These results are obtained in almost all
cases in which infant mortality, child mortality, and life expectancy are used as health outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide the summary of
the existing literature related to our study. In section 3, we present a model and derive testable
predictions on the relationship between ethnic composition and the social welfare. In section 4, our
theoretical predictions are empirically examined. The conclusion is provided in Section 5.
2 Related Literature
As mentioned in the previous section, a large number of studies show the negative relationship
between ethnic diversity and public goods provision.4 The prominent studies on the underlying
mechanism of this relationship focus on ethnic preferences (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and La
Ferarra, 2000; Luttmer, 2001; Vigdor, 2004) and social sanctions (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005).
Alesina et al. (1999) argue that preferences for the type and the size of local public goods are
divergent in an ethnically diverse society, and a large level of public goods is not supported by the
majority. Luttmer (2001) ﬁnds that individuals’ support for welfare spending depends positively
3Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) empirically show that the improving eﬀects of education and health expenditure
on their corresponding outcomes become smaller as the corruption level increases.
4Along with the studies referred to in the previous section, see also Alesina et al. (2001), Dayton-Johnson (2000),
Khwaja (2009), Okten and Osili (2004), and Poterba (1997), among others.
4on the share of their own ethnic group in the entire beneﬁciaries. Vigdor (2004) examines similar
eﬀects and ﬁnds that individuals contribute less to public beneﬁts in a more ethnically heterogeneous
society. Miguel and Gugerty (2005) show that ethnic diversity leads to few public goods due to few
social sanctions against free-riders.
This paper diﬀers from previous studies as follows. First, we consider political selection as the
mechanism through which ethnic diversity aﬀects public policy. Second, as a public policy, our
model considers allocation of an exogenous government budget among ethnic groups rather than
the size of public goods provision or transfer. Finally, this paper shows a non-monotonic relationship
between ethnic heterogeneity and policy outcomes in a democracy without a dominant group.
The model of this paper is related to the literature of political selection, which analyzes who
will be selected as a politician from heterogeneous individuals (Acemoglu et al., 2010; Besley, 2005;
Besley and Coate, 1997; Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Diermeier et al., 2005; Mattozi and Merlo,
2008; Messner and Polborn, 2004; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996).5 This paper, however, diﬀers from
these studies in the sense that it analyzes the eﬀect of ethnic composition on political selection.
Banerjee and Pande (2009) study both political selection and the role of ethnicity in politics. While
we focus on the eﬀect of ethnic fractionalization on policy outcome, their focus is on the eﬀect of
“ethnicization” on the quality of politicians, which is the degree of importance that voters attach
to candidates’ parochialism. In their model, parties choose candidates’ characteristics (quality
and parochialism) to maximize vote share, and they analyze the eﬀect of the increase in voter’s
ethnicization. By contrast, in our model, all individuals decide whether or not to run for election
to realize their most preferred policy, and ethnic fractionalization aﬀects individuals’ incentives for
running for election, the type of the elected politician, and policy outcomes.
To the best of our knowledge, the closest approach to the theoretical part of this paper is the
model developed by Fern´ andez and Levy (2008) that study the relationship between ethnic diversity
5Caselli and Morelli (2004) and Messner and Polborn (2004) analyze the quality of a politician based on the
citizen-candidate model. Diermeier et al. (2005) and Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) demonstrate political selection
in environments where experience in politics aﬀects future payoﬀ of politicians. Acemoglu et al. (2010) develop a
dynamic model of political selection and analyze how low quality government persists.
5and public policy in considering political selection. They analyze the model of endogenous party
formation to examine the relationship between diversity and two types of income redistribution, one
of which is general redistribution and the other is targeted goods to the poor in the interest groups.
In one equilibrium, which always exists, a representative of the poor who do not belong to the
interest groups wins and implements maximal general redistribution, but there is another equilib-
rium in which the rich and some interest groups of the poor form a minimum winning coalition and
implement lower general redistribution and positive targeted redistribution. In the latter equilib-
rium, greater diversity leads to lower general redistribution and larger targeted redistribution. But
this equilibrium disappears when diversity is high enough. This non-monotonic eﬀect of diversity
depends on the party formation and the cost of targeted goods that is increasing with the number
of interest groups in the winning coalition. Therefore, the mechanism of the non-monotonic eﬀect
of diversity in their model is quite diﬀerent from ours. Furthermore, while they study the conﬂict
between the rich and the poor, our focus is on the condition under which the benevolent individual
is selected as a politician. We also take into account the presence of a dominant ethnic group and
political regimes and show that the eﬀects of diversity in a democracy without a dominant group
are diﬀerent from those in a democracy with a dominant group and a dictatorship.
Furthermore, two types of evidence in previous studies are associated with our empirical anal-
ysis. First, regarding the ethnic fractionalization and health outcomes, many previous studies ﬁnd
the negative relationship between them (e.g., Alesina et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1999). Second, re-
garding the eﬀect of political regimes on health outcomes, some studies provide evidence that health
outcomes are better in more democratic countries (e.g., Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006; Kudamatsu,
2011; Zweifel and Navia, 2000).6
Finally, while few studies have examined the eﬀect of ethnic fractionalization both in a democracy
and a dictatorship, the studies conducted by Collier (2000, 2001) and Bluedorn (2001) are notable
exceptions. Collier (2000) theoretically and empirically shows that when income redistribution and
6Ross (2006) conducts the data imputation and employs the dataset that includes authoritarian nations with high
performance. He ﬁnds that if global health trends and country-speciﬁc factors are controlled for, democracy has no
inﬂuence on infant mortality.
6economic growth have a trade-oﬀ relationship, the eﬀect of ethnic diversity on economic growth
depends on political regimes, and ethnic diversity hinders economic growth under limited political
rights but does not aﬀect the growth under a democracy. Bluedorn (2001) also provides empirical
evidence that a democracy ameliorates a negative eﬀect of ethnic diversity on economic growth.
Collier (2001) considers the eﬀect of the presence of a dominant ethnic group whose population size
is large enough to make up a majority. However, our study diﬀers from those previous studies in
the following ways. For the theoretical part, unlike theirs, we consider the mechanism of political
selection. For the empirical part, we examine the eﬀect of ethnic composition on health outcomes,




Consider a society comprising N ethnic groups. Let Si be the population size of group i. The entire




The standard deﬁnition of ethnic fractionalization is the probability that two randomly selected






There are two types of individuals. One comprises those who care only about their own beneﬁt,
which we call type e. The other comprises those who care about the welfare of the whole society,
which we call type s. Type s individuals, therefore, have benevolent preferences. In each ethnic
group, a fraction σ of individuals is assumed to be type s, and a fraction 1 − σ is assumed to be
7Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) also conﬁrm that the negative eﬀect of ethnic diversity on growth becomes smaller
as a democracy matures.
7type e. A plausible value of σ would be diﬀerent among societies, and it may be very small in some
societies. We assume that σ ∈ (0,1).
The government has exogenous revenue T and distributes it to each group. Let gi be the level
of per capita transfer of group i, and let g = (g1,...,gN) be the policy vector. Therefore, the
government budget constraint is given by:
N ∑
i=1
Sigi = T. (2)
We can also interpret gi as the level of local public goods of unit cost Si if a geographical distribution
of ethnic groups is highly segregated.8
Since type e individuals care only about their own beneﬁt, the policy payoﬀ of type e individuals
in group i depends only on gi. Let Ue
i (g) be the policy payoﬀ of type e individuals in group i from
policy g. We assume that Ue
i (g) is given by:
Ue
i (g) = gα
i , α ∈ (0,1). (3)
Note that we can also interpret type e individuals as those who care only about the beneﬁt of their
own ethnic group. Type s individuals care about the welfare of the whole society, and we assume






Type s individuals prefer the policy that maximizes the social welfare function expressed in (4). We
can interpret gα
i as material beneﬁt of individuals in group i from the policy. The policy payoﬀ of
type e individuals is their own material beneﬁt. The policy payoﬀ of type s individuals is not their
own material beneﬁt but the sum of the all individuals’ material beneﬁts. For example, we can
interpret gα
i as the health condition of children of each individual in group i. The health condition
improves with the increase in per capita transfer, but the improving eﬀect diminishes as per capita
8Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) point out that the degree of segregation of ethnic groups is higher in poor countries
than in rich ones.
8transfer increases. Then, function (4) represents the health condition of the average child in this
society.








j = 0 for all j ̸= i. (5)
From (2) and (4), the most preferred policy of type s individuals, gs, is:
gs
i = T for all i ∈ {1,...,N}. (6)
The political process is based on the citizen-candidate model (Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne
and Slivinski, 1996). In a democracy, all individuals can run for oﬃce, and the candidate who wins
the election chooses the policy. In a dictatorship, the right to run for election and the right to vote
are limited to a speciﬁc ethnic group, as we will explain later. The timing and the details of the
political process are as follows:
1. Each individual decides whether or not to run for election. Entry cost is δ > 0. The candidates
cannot commit to which policy he/she will implement after winning the election.
2. A politician is chosen among the candidates by plurality rule voting. We assume sincere
voting, which means that each individual votes for the most preferred candidate.
3. The winning politician chooses policy g.
We denote the psychological and pecuniary beneﬁt the politician earns from holding oﬃce as υ,
and, for simplicity, we assume υ = 0. Candidates, therefore, run for election to choose their most
preferred policies. Since a politician is chosen by plurality rule voting, the candidate who wins the
most votes holds oﬃce. In the event of a tie where multiple candidates win the most votes, these
candidates win with the same probability. When a voter has multiple most preferred candidates,
he/she votes for one of them in a random manner. When there is only one candidate, the candidate
wins with probability one. If no one runs for election, the status quo policy ¯ g = 0 is implemented.
9Since the politician holding oﬃce implements his/her most preferred policy, from (5) and (6), a
type e voter has the following preference over the candidates:
type e candidates of own group
≻ type s candidates
≻ type e candidates of other groups.
Type s voters prefer type s candidates to type e candidates. When the policy most preferred by
a type e individual in group i is implemented, the policy payoﬀ of a type s individual is S1−α
i Tα.
Therefore, a type s individual prefers a type e candidate in a larger group to a type e candidate in
a smaller group.
The ultimate payoﬀ of each individual is separable in the policy payoﬀ and the entry cost, which
he/she pays if running for election. We evaluate the social welfare resulting from policy g by the
policy payoﬀ function of type s, i.e.,
∑N
i=1 Sigα
i .9 As mentioned above, the health condition of the
average child in this society can be represented by this social welfare function.
3.2 Equilibria
We seek for subgame perfect equilibria of this game. In the equilibrium:
• The politician holding oﬃce chooses his/her most preferred policy because candidates cannot
commit their campaign promise during an election.
• Since we assume sincere voting, each individual votes for the candidate who brings him/her
the largest policy payoﬀ among the candidates.
• Each individual’s decision on whether or not to run for election is optimal given the other
individuals’ decisions.
There can be multiple equilibria in this game. When the number of candidates in equilibrium
is x, we call it x-candidate equilibrium following previous studies.
9Including the entry cost δ into the calculation of social welfare does not change the subsequent argument.
10Concerning the parameter of the model, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1
Tα > δ.
The LHS in the inequality is type s’ policy payoﬀ from the most preferred policy, and the RHS is
the cost of running for election. Assumption 1, therefore, means that running for election is optimal
for a type s individual if no one runs for election.
In what follows, we examine three diﬀerent situations for political regimes and for ethnic com-
position. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst case is that a dominant group exists in a democracy; the second is
that a dominant group does not exist in a democracy; and the third is a dictatorship.
3.2.1 Democracy with a Dominant Group
We ﬁrst consider the case of democratic regime. In a democracy, all citizens have the right to vote
and the right to run for election. Furthermore, concerning an ethnic composition, we assume that
a dominant group exists. We say that there is a dominant group when:
(1 − σ)Si >
1
2
for some i ∈ {1,...,N}. (7)
This means that type e individuals of the dominant group account for more than half of the popu-
lation.10 If σ is negligibly small, this case implies that the share of the most populous ethnic group
is larger than 50 percent. For simplicity, we assume that the dominant group is group 1. Then, the
following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, in the case of a democracy with a dominant group,
a one-candidate equilibrium exists where a type e individual of the dominant group runs for election.





− δ > Tα (8)
10We exclude the infrequent case where (1 − σ)Si = 1/2 for some i to restrict the equilibria we must consider.
11holds, this one-candidate equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. If condition (8) does not hold, there
is also a one-candidate equilibrium where a type s individual runs for election.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that a one-candidate equilibrium exists where a type e individual of the
dominant group runs for election. It is the subgame perfect equilibrium if, anticipating the optimal
policy choices of the winning candidate and sincere voting, each individual’s decision on whether
or not to run for election is optimal given the other individuals’ decisions. From Assumption 1,
it follows that (T/S1)
α > δ. Therefore, given that other individuals do not run for election, it
is optimal for the type e candidate of the dominant group to run for election. Since δ > 0 and
υ = 0, given that there is one type e candidate of the dominant group, it is optimal for other type
e members of the dominant group not to run for election, and, therefore, all type e members of
the dominant group vote for the candidate. Since (1 − σ)S1 > 1/2, the type e candidate wins a
majority vote in this case, and type s individuals and type e individuals of other groups cannot win
the election even if they run. Therefore, given that there is one type e candidate of the dominant
group, it is optimal for type s individuals and type e individuals of other groups not to run for
election. Accordingly, each individual’s decision on running for election is a best response to the
other individuals’ decisions, and a one-candidate equilibrium exists where a type e individual of the
dominant group runs for election.
We next show that if condition (8) holds, the above one-candidate equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium. When there is a type e candidate of the dominant group, type s individuals and type e
individuals of other groups have no chance to win, and it is optimal for them not to run for election.
This means that the above equilibrium is the only equilibrium where a type e individual of the
dominant group runs for election. Under the assumption that δ > 0 and υ = 0, in equilibrium the
pool of candidates does not include multiple type s candidates and multiple type e candidates of
the same group. Thus, we must check the following three cases:
(i) the pool of candidates comprises some type e individuals of diﬀerent groups other than the
dominant group.
12(ii) the pool of candidates comprises a type s individual and some type e individuals of diﬀerent
groups other than the dominant group.
(iii) the pool of candidates comprises a type s individual.
In case (i), a type e individual of the dominant group can increase his/her payoﬀ by running
for election since (T/S1)
α > δ. Therefore, it cannot be an equilibrium. In case (ii), all type e
individuals of the dominant group vote for the type s candidate; therefore, the type e candidates
lose with probability one. Then, the type e candidates can increase their payoﬀ by giving up running
for election, and it cannot be an equilibrium.
Thus, only case (iii) can be an equilibrium. If condition (8) holds, given that only a type s
individual runs for election, a type e individual of the dominant group can increase his/her payoﬀ
by running for election. Therefore, when condition (8) holds, case (iii) cannot be an equilibrium. On
the other hand, when condition (8) does not hold, case (iii) is an equilibrium since each individual’s
decision on whether to run for election is a best response to the other individuals’ decisions.
In the equilibrium where a type e individual becomes a politician, the government budget is
exclusively allocated to the dominant group. On the other hand, in the equilibrium where a type
s individual becomes a politician, all ethnic groups can equally receive the transfer. When some
groups receive no government budget, health outcomes in these groups would be bad due to the




of social welfare loss compared to the policy of a type s politician. Thus, as the group size Si is
smaller, the social welfare loss is larger.
When condition (8) holds, the one-candidate equilibrium where a type e individual of the dom-
inant group runs for election is the unique equilibrium. When condition (8) does not hold, the
game has multiple equilibria, and there is also another one-candidate equilibrium where a type s
individual runs for election.11 When the size of the dominant group S1 is suﬃciently large, condition
11Note that condition (8) implies Assumption 1 since (1 − σ)S1 > 1/2.
13(8) does not hold, and both of the two equilibria exist. When S1 is small, type e individuals in the
dominant group can substantially increase the policy payoﬀ by allocating the government budget
exclusively to the dominant group. Therefore, when S1 is small, the one-candidate equilibrium of a
type s candidate is hard to exist.
The size of the dominant group S1 is positively related to the social welfare (and health outcomes)
for the following two reasons:
• As S1 is smaller, in the equilibrium where a type e individual becomes a politician, a larger
share of the population receives no transfer, and the social welfare loss is larger.
• As S1 is smaller, condition (8) is easier to be satisﬁed, and it is unlikely that the equilibrium
exists where a type s individual becomes a politician.
Therefore, in the case of a democracy with a dominant group, if σ is negligibly small, the social
welfare is worst when the share of the dominant group in the population is near 50 percent.
The smaller the size of the dominant group is, the larger ethnic fractionalization would be.
The above argument, therefore, implies a negative relationship between ethnic fractionalization and
health outcomes.
3.2.2 Democracy without a Dominant Group
We next consider the case of a democracy without a dominant group. We say that there is no
dominant group when:
(1 − σ)Si <
1
2
for all i ∈ {1,...,N}. (9)
In this case, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2 Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, in the case of a democracy without a dominant
group, a one-candidate equilibrium where a type s individual runs for election always exists.
Proof. We show that, when there is one type s candidate, each individual’s decision on whether or
not to run for election is optimal given the other individuals’ decisions. From Assumption 1, given
14that all other individuals do not run for election, it is optimal for the type s candidate to run for
election. Since δ > 0 and υ = 0, it is optimal for other type s individuals not to run for election.
When there is one type s candidate, if a type e individual of group i runs for election, all type e
members of group i vote for this type e candidate, and all other individuals in this society vote for
the type s candidate. Since (1 − σ)Si < 1/2, this type e candidate will lose with probability one.
Therefore, when there is one type s candidate, it is optimal for type e individuals not to run for
election. Thus, a one-candidate equilibrium exists where a type s individual runs for election.
Unlike the case of a democracy with a dominant group, the one-candidate equilibrium where
a type s individual becomes a politician always exists in a democracy without a dominant group.
The equilibrium where type e individuals run for election may also exist in a democracy without a
dominant group. In what follows, we ﬁrst consider the case where the size of all groups is equal and
then consider the case of diﬀerent group sizes. The results derived in both cases are essentially the
same. Although the assumption of equal group size is not realistic, this case is simple and clear.
In the case of diﬀerent group sizes, we can consider not only the number of groups but also the
population share of small groups as the determinants of ethnic fractionalization.
3.2.3 Democracy without a Dominant Group: The Case of Equal Group Size
Concerning group size, we assume that:
S1 = S2 = ... = SN =
1
N
, N ≥ 2. (10)
Since the number of groups is more than one, (1 − σ)Si < 1/2 for all groups, and no dominant
group exists. From Proposition 2, the one-candidate equilibrium where a type s individual runs for
election exists in the case of equal group size. Since fractionalization is 1 − 1/N in this case, an
increase in N causes high degree of fractionalization.
Concerning the parameter, we make the following assumptions in this section:
15Assumption 2











Assumption 2 means that, for any N ≥ 2, if a type s individual can win election with probability
one, a type s individual prefers running for election to letting a type e individual hold oﬃce. Note
that Assumption 2 implies Assumption 1. As we discuss in Appendix A, the main results derived
below still hold even if Assumption 2 is replaced with Assumption 1. Assumption 3 means that the
number of type e individuals in each group does not coincide with the number of type s individuals
in the society. We make this assumption to exclude the equilibrium that exists only when the two
numbers are equal.
In what follows, we will show that, in the case of equal group size, the other possible equilibrium
is an N-candidate equilibrium where all groups turn out one type e candidate. While the one-
candidate equilibrium where a type s individual runs for election always exists, this N-candidate










When the pool of candidates comprises N type e candidates from diﬀerent groups, all of the candi-
dates obtain the same votes and win with probability 1/N. The LHS of condition (11) is, therefore,
the expected policy payoﬀ of the type e candidates in such case. Condition (11), therefore, means
that when there are N candidates of type e individuals from diﬀerent groups, it is optimal for each
candidate to run for election. Condition (12) means that the number of type e individuals in each
group is larger than the number of type s individuals in the society.
16Proposition 3 Let Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. We also assume equal group size as expressed in
(10). Then, an N-candidate equilibrium where each group turns out one type e candidate exists if
and only if conditions (11) and (12) both hold.
Proof. Necessity: We prove by contradiction that if an N-candidate equilibrium exists where each
group turns out one type e candidate, then both conditions (11) and (12) must hold. Suppose that
condition (11) does not hold. If condition (11) does not hold, a type e candidate can increase his/her
payoﬀ by giving up running for election in the N-candidate equilibrium. This is contradiction. Next,
suppose that condition (12) does not hold. If a type s individual runs for election when there are
N type e candidates from diﬀerent groups, he/she obtains σ votes from type s individuals. In such
a case, the type e candidates obtain (1 − σ)1/N votes from type e individuals of their own group.
Because condition (12) does not hold, from Assumption 3, we obtain (1 − σ)1/N < σ. Therefore,
given that there are N type e candidates from diﬀerent groups, a type s individual can win the
election with probability one if running for election when condition (12) does not hold. From
Assumption 2, it is optimal for type s individuals to do so. This also contradicts the assumption
that an N-candidate equilibrium exists where all groups turn out one type e candidate.
Suﬃciency: We show that if both conditions (11) and (12) hold, an N-candidate equilibrium
exists where there is one type e candidate in each group. From condition (11), it is optimal for
the type e candidates to run for election. Given that each group turns out one type e candidate, if
other type e individual in group i runs for election, the votes that were supposed to be obtained by
the incumbent group i candidate are shared with the two candidates, and both of the candidates
lose certainly. Thus, given that there are N type e candidates from diﬀerent groups, it is optimal
for other type e individuals not to run for election. If a type s individual runs for election when
there are N type e candidates from diﬀerent groups, the type s loses with probability one due to
condition (12). Thus, it is optimal for type s individuals not to run for election. Therefore, an
N-candidate equilibrium exists where there is one type e candidate in each group.
Furthermore, the following proposition holds.
17Proposition 4 Let Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. In the case of a democracy with equal group
size, there is no equilibrium other than the one-candidate equilibrium in Proposition 2 and the
N-candidate equilibrium in Proposition 3.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that the equilibrium where no type s individual runs for election must be
the N-candidate equilibrium in Proposition 3. Consider that a pool of candidates comprises only
type e candidates and that there is at least one group that turns out no candidate. In this case,
a type s candidate can win the election with probability one if running for the election. This is
because, while the type e candidates obtain votes of type e individuals of their own group, the type
s candidate wins the votes of type e individuals in the group that does not turn out any candidate
in addition to the votes of type s individuals. From Assumption 2, if a type s individual is certain
to win an election, it is optimal for him/her to run for election. Therefore, in the equilibrium where
no type s individual runs for election, all groups must turn out one type e candidate, and it is the
N-candidates equilibrium in Proposition 3.
Since there cannot be multiple type s candidates in equilibrium, showing that the one-candidate
equilibrium in Proposition 2 is the only equilibrium where the pool of candidates includes a type
s candidate completes the proof. To do this, we show that the case where the pool of candidates
includes both a type s candidate and some type e candidates cannot be equilibrium. To show the
contradiction, assume that there is equilibrium where both a type s individual and type e individuals
run for election. In such an equilibrium, all groups must turn out one type e candidate. If not,
the type s candidate can win with probability one, and it is suboptimal for type e candidates to
run for election. When all groups turn out one type e candidate and there is one type s candidate,
the type e candidates obtain (1 − σ)1/N votes and the type s candidate obtains σ votes. In this
case, from Assumption 3, either the type e candidates or the type s candidate lose with probability
one. This is a contradiction to the assumption that such pool of candidates constitutes equilibrium.
Therefore, the one-candidate equilibrium in Proposition 2 is the only equilibrium where the pool of
candidates includes a type s candidate, and the proof is completed.








In the N-candidate equilibrium where each group turns out one type e candidate, each candidate
wins the election with probability 1/N. When N is suﬃciently large, since the winning probability
is suﬃciently small, running for election does not pay the type e candidates, and the N-candidate
equilibrium disappears.





Given that there are N type e candidates from diﬀerent groups, if a type s individual runs for the
election, each type e candidate obtains (1 − σ)1/N votes and the type s candidate obtains σ votes.
When N is suﬃciently large, the number of votes obtained by the type e candidates is small, the
type s candidate can win the election, and it is optimal for the type s candidate to run for the
election. Therefore, when N is suﬃciently large, the N-candidate equilibrium disappears.












then the N-candidate equilibrium does not exist, and the one-candidate equilibrium where a type
s individual runs for election is the unique equilibrium.
In the case of a democracy with equal group size, the relationship between ethnic fractionaliza-
tion and the social welfare (or health outcomes) is as follows:
• When ethnic fractionalization is suﬃciently large (N is suﬃciently large), the one-candidate
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. In the equilibrium, the government policy is imple-
mented to maximize the social welfare, and health outcomes would be good.
19• When ethnic fractionalization is not suﬃciently large (N is not suﬃciently large), both the
one-candidate equilibrium and the N-candidate equilibrium exist. In the N-candidate equi-
librium, as N is larger, the size of each group is smaller and the welfare loss due to the
policy implemented by a type e politician is larger (the share of people who cannot receive the
government expenditure is larger). Therefore, when fractionalization is not suﬃciently large,
health outcomes become worse as fractionalization increases.
In Appendix A, we show that the relationship between N and the existence of the N-candidate
equilibrium is preserved even if Assumption 2 is replaced with Assumption 1.
3.2.4 Democracy without a Dominant Group: The Case of Diﬀerent Group Size
We divide N groups into the largest groups and the other groups. Let group i ∈ {1,...,M} be the
major groups and let group i ∈ {M + 1,...,N} be the small groups. Let x ∈ (0,1) be the population
share of the small groups. The major groups have equal group size; that is:
S1 = ... = SM =
1
M
(1 − x), M ≥ 1.




(1 − x) for all i ∈ {M + 1,...,N}.
This means that the major groups have the largest group size. The groups classiﬁed in the major
groups have the same group size. As will become clear later, this classiﬁcation is useful because a
type e candidate cannot beat another type e candidate whose group size is larger than that of the
former candidate. Since the case with a dominant group is already considered in section 2.2.1, we
consider the case where no dominant group exists, and, therefore, assume the following:
1
M




20Note that this condition necessarily holds when M ≥ 2. From Proposition 2, there is the one-
candidate equilibrium where a type s individual runs for election. In this section, we make the
following assumptions, which are the modiﬁed versions of Assumptions 2 and 3:
Assumption 2a










̸= σ (1 − x) + x.
Similar to Assumption 2, Assumption 2a means that if a type s individual can win election with
probability one, a type s individual prefers running for election to letting a type e individual in a
major group hold oﬃce. Note that when M ≥ 2, Assumption 2 implies Assumption 2a. We make
this modiﬁcation to take the case of M = 1 into consideration. Assumption 3a is a modiﬁed version
of Assumption 3. The LHS is the number of type e individuals in each major group, and the RHS
is the sum of the number of type s individuals in the major groups and the number of individuals
in the small groups. Then, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 5 Let Assumptions 2a and 3a hold. There is an M-candidate equilibrium where each












> σ (1 − x) + x. (17)
Furthermore, there is no other equilibrium other than the one-candidate equilibrium where a type s
individual runs for election and this M-candidate equilibrium.
Proof. We can prove this proposition similar to the proof of Propositions 3 and 4. See Appendix
A.
21Condition (16) means that when each major group turns out one type e candidate, it is optimal
for the candidate to run for election. Condition (16) can be written as:






δ1/α ≡ x∗ (M), (18)
and x∗ (M) is increasing in M and takes negative value when M = 1. As x is large, the group size of
the major group is small, and the policy payoﬀ which the type e candidate receives by implementing
the most preferred policy is large. When there are M type e candidates from diﬀerent major groups,
each candidate wins with probability 1/M, and larger M means lower winning probability.
When the pool of candidates comprises M type e individuals from diﬀerent major groups and a
type s individual, the type e candidate obtains (1 − σ)(1 − x)/M votes, and the type s candidate
obtains σ (1 − x) + x votes. Therefore, when condition (17) is satisﬁed, given that there are M
type e candidates from diﬀerent major groups, it is optimal for a type s individual not to run for
election. When the pool of candidates comprises M type e individuals from diﬀerent major groups
and a type s individual, as x becomes larger, the type s candidate obtains more votes while the
type e candidates obtain less. The votes obtained by the type e candidates are also decreasing in
M. Condition (17) can be written as:
x <
(1 − σ)1/M − σ
(1 − σ)(1 + 1/M)
≡ x∗∗ (M),
and x∗∗ (M) is decreasing in M and is smaller than 1.12
The M-candidate equilibrium where each major group turns out one type e candidate exists if
and only if x ∈ [max{0,x∗ (M)},x∗∗ (M)). As M is large, this interval shrinks, and it is empty
when M is suﬃciently large. If M or x is suﬃciently large, the M-candidate equilibrium does
not exist, and the one-candidate equilibrium where a type s individual becomes a politician is the
unique equilibrium. When M is suﬃciently large, the M-candidate equilibrium does not exist due
to low winning probability for each candidate, or a small vote share in the election which will arise
12Note that when there is no dominant group, condition (17) does not hold under M = 1.
22in the history where M type e individuals from diﬀerent major groups and a type s individual run
for election. When x is suﬃciently large, the M-candidate equilibrium does not exist due to the
small vote share in such an election.
When M and x are large, fractionalization would be large. Therefore, when fractionalization
is suﬃciently large, the one-candidate equilibrium is the unique equilibrium, and health outcomes
would be good. When x ∈ [max{0,x∗ (M)},x∗∗ (M)), both the M-candidate equilibrium and the
one-candidate equilibrium exist. Large M or large x means small size of the major group and
large welfare loss due to the policy by a type e politician. Therefore, when fractionalization is not
suﬃciently large (x ∈ [max{0,x∗ (M)},x∗∗ (M))), an increase in fractionalization (an increase in
M or x) would lead to worse health outcomes.13
3.2.5 Dictatorship
We next consider the case of a dictatorship. We assume that a certain ethnic group exclusively
seizes political power and that the right to vote and the right to run for election are limited to the
members of this politically dominant group. Collier (2000) argues that, “The dictator draws his
power base from his own ethnic group by recruiting the army only from this group” (p.229) and
that he must acquire enough support from the army to prevent coups by the army. Collier further
states that, “If the army is drawn randomly from the ethnic group, and if soldiers retain the interest
of the household to which they belong, then this subjects the dictator to a constraint analogous to
the median-voter rule within his own ethnic group” (p.229). Along with his argument, we consider
that, in a dictatorship, the dictator is elected through political competition within his ethnic group.
As for the assumption that a certain ethnic group necessarily seizes political power, the alternative
assumption that a dictator is randomly drawn from the politicians who win the political competition
within their own ethnic groups does not change the essence of the argument. We also assume that
type e individuals make up a majority in each group, that is, σ < 1/2. Without loss of generality,
13When M is suﬃciently large such that x
∗ (M) > 0 and x is suﬃciently small such that x < x
∗ (M), the M-
candidate equilibrium does not exist. This makes the relationship between fractionalization and the existence of
M-candidate equilibrium somewhat ambiguous compared to the case in Section 3.2.3.
23let group 1 be the politically dominant group. Then, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 6 Let Assumption 1 hold. In the case of a dictatorship, a one-candidate equilibrium






− δ > Tα
holds, this is the unique equilibrium in this case. When condition (8) does not hold, there is also
a one-candidate equilibrium where a type s individual in the politically dominant group runs for
election.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof for Proposition 1. We ﬁrst show that a one-candidate
equilibrium exists where a type e individual in the politically dominant group runs for election.
From Assumption 1, it is optimal for the type e candidate to run for election. Since δ > 0 and
υ = 0, it is optimal for other type e individuals in the politically dominant group not to run for
election. Since type e individuals make up a majority in the group, a type s individual loses with
probability one even if he/she competes with the type e candidate in the election. Thus, it is optimal
for type s individuals in the politically dominant group not to run for election, and a one-candidate
equilibrium exists where a type e individual in the politically dominant group runs for election.
The other possible equilibrium is a one-candidate equilibrium where a type s individual in the
politically dominant group runs for election. When condition (8) holds, given that there is one type
s candidate, it is optimal for a type e individual in the group to run for election, and it cannot be an
equilibrium. If condition (8) does not hold, when there is one type s candidate, the decision of each
individual in the politically dominant group is a best response to the other members’ decisions, and
there is a one-candidate equilibrium where a type s individual in the politically dominant group
runs for election.
The size of the politically dominant group is positively related with the social welfare due to
the following two reasons. First, as the size of the politically dominant group is smaller, condition
24(8) is easier to hold, and the equilibrium where a type s individual becomes a politician becomes
less likely to exist. Second, as the size of the politically dominant group is smaller, in the one-
candidate equilibrium where a type e individual becomes a politician, more people cannot receive
the government resources, and the welfare loss due to the policy of the type e politician is larger.
When fractionalization is large, the group size of the politically dominant group tends to be
small. For example, in the case of equal group size, as fractionalization is larger, the size of the
politically dominant group is smaller. The above argument, therefore, implies a negative relationship
between fractionalization and health outcomes.
3.3 Summary on the Theoretical Predictions
Summarizing the previous argument, our model derives the following three testable predictions
(P1), (P2), and (P3) about the relationship between fractionalization and health outcomes.
(P1) In a democracy with a dominant group, an increase in fractionalization (a decrease in the
size of the dominant group) leads to worse health outcomes.
(P2) In a democracy without a dominant group, the relationship between fractionalization and
health outcomes is non-monotonic. When fractionalization is not suﬃciently high, health out-
comes worsen in fractionalization. When fractionalization is suﬃciently high, health outcomes
are good.
(P3) In a dictatorship, an increase in fractionalization causes worse health outcomes.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 Estimation Methodology
In this section, we empirically examine three testable predictions derived from our model. As
discussed in the Introduction, we employ health outcomes as the proxy for the social welfare resulting
from public policy. Due to the availability of the data, we assemble the dataset for 154 countries
25in every ﬁve years from 1960 to 2005.14 The estimation equation for predictions (P1) and (P3) is
speciﬁed as:
Healthit = α + βFractionalizationi + Xitγ + µt + εit,
where i stands for a country and t represents a time period. µ is year ﬁxed-eﬀects and ε is an
error term. Health is health outcomes such as infant mortality, child mortality, or life expectancy.
Fractionalization is ethnic fractionalization generated by Alesina et al. (2003). In our theoretical
model, fractionalization and the size of a dominant ethnic group are interchangeably interpreted.
Thus, as a robustness check, we also employ the size of a dominant ethnic group instead of fraction-
alization as an explanatory variable of interest in the case of a democracy with a dominant ethnic
group. Given the constraint on the data availability and the fact that the magnitude of change
of ethnic fractionalization in a country is very small, fractionalization and the size of a dominant
group are regarded as time invariant in our dataset.15 Year ﬁxed-eﬀects are used to control for
global trends such as an improvement in medical technology and its diﬀusion. X includes other
control variables such as the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita, government expenditure as
a share of GDP, average years of secondary schooling as a proxy for human capital, the natural
logarithm of total population, a dummy variable for an incidence of war, malaria ecology index, and
two regional dummies of “Sub-Saharan Africa” and “Latin America and Caribbean.”16 We include
income level in the estimation equation to capture the fact that health outcomes can be better in
high-income countries. Because government revenue is exogenously given in our model, we control
for government expenditures as a share of GDP. An increase in government spending is expected
14Employing cross-sectional data, constructed by taking the average of each variable over a speciﬁc period, can be
considered as another approach for the estimation. However, our study does not adopt this strategy for the following
reasons. First, the averaged data may not appropriately reﬂect the degree of democracy in a country if compared to
the data in multiple years, which captures the evolution of political regime in a country more accurately. Second, if
we use the averaged data, the sample size in the case of democracy without a dominant group is too small for the
estimation.
15Alesina et al. (2003) state that, “The bottom line is that while we recognize that ethnic fractionalization could to
some extent be endogenous, and that the previous literature has probably underplayed this point, we do not believe
this is a very serious problem at the horizon of 20-30 years which characterizes our cross-country work” (p.161).
16In exploring the determinants of health outcome, Alesina et al. (2003), Besley and Kudamatsu (2006), and La
Porta et al. (1999) consider the legal origins developed by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) as control variables. However,
we do not take legal origins into account, because, unlike previous studies, we divide the whole sample into three
subsamples, and there may be multicollinearity problems.
26to improve health outcomes. Human capital reﬂects basic medical knowledge, which can improve
health outcomes. The eﬀect of population may be somewhat ambiguous. While medical services
in populous countries may be more eﬃcient, congestion may cause worse sanitation. Incidence of
war apparently worsens health outcomes. The malaria ecology index is deﬁned as the potential
intensity of malaria transmission, uncolored by clinical externalities. Malaria can be an important
determinant of health outcomes. Finally, two regional dummies of “Sub-Saharan Africa” and “Latin
America and Caribbean” are included because of more severe climate conditions and/or high income
inequality, which aﬀect health in theses areas.
According to the prediction (P2), in a democracy without a dominant ethnic group, health
outcomes are high when fractionalization is low, and health outcomes become worse as fraction-
alization increases. When fractionalization rises to the suﬃcient level, health outcomes become
high again. Therefore, the prediction (P2) suggests the (inverted) U-shaped relationship between
health outcomes (mortality) and fractionalization. To test the prediction (P2), the squared term
of fractionalization is added in the estimation equation to capture the possibility of the inverted
U-shaped relationship; that is:
Healthit = α + β1Fractionalizationi + β2Fractionalization2
i + Xitγ + µt + εit.
As the estimation methodology, we employ the ordinary least squares estimation and report the
robust standard errors clustered at the country level, because the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation cannot be
applied due to the time invariance of fractionalization and the size of a dominant group.
Three datasets are created from the whole sample for testing our theoretical predictions (P1)
to (P3). In order to make these subsamples, two criteria must be determined. One is whether a
country is democratic or dictatorial, and the other is whether or not a dominant ethnic group exists
in a country. First, as for a democracy and a dictatorship, the data in the Polity IV is employed
(Marshall, 2010). Variable polity2 in the Polity IV database represents a level of a democracy
annually. This variable is ranged from −10 to 10, and a larger value indicates more democratic.
27Following Persson and Tabellini (2009), we deﬁne a country as democratic if polity2 is strictly
positive and dictatorial otherwise. Next, a dominant ethnic group in our model is deﬁned as (7).
Although, in reality, a fraction of people who care for the whole society (σ) should be considered,
in our empirical analysis, σ is assumed to be negligibly small in a benchmark case. In other words,
a dominant group exists in a country if a fraction of the most populous ethnic group is larger than
0.5. In addition, as a robustness check, the estimation results in the case where σ is equal to 0.2
are also reported. This case is equivalent to the case where a dominant group exists if a fraction of
the most populous ethnic group is larger than 0.625.
According to these two criteria, the ﬁrst dataset for prediction (P1) comprises democratic coun-
tries with a dominant group. The number of countries categorized in this subsample is 85 out of 154
countries. In the second dataset for prediction (P2), 29 democratic countries without a dominant
group are included. A third dataset for prediction (P3) comprises 109 countries that are dictato-
rial. It is noteworthy that since some countries move between dictatorship and democracy, they are
included in these two subsamples at diﬀerent years. The details on the countries in each sample are
shown in Table A1 in Appendix B.
The expected signs of the estimated coeﬃcients of fractionalization for the case of infant or child
mortality are as follows. Prediction (P1) insists that, in the case of a democracy with a dominant
group, an increase in fractionalization (a decrease in the size of a dominant group) worsens health
outcomes. Thus, the coeﬃcient of fractionalization (β) is expected to be positive. Next, prediction
(P2) suggests the inverted U-shaped relationship between mortality and fractionalization in the
case of a democracy without a dominant group. Speciﬁcally, when a level of fractionalization is not
suﬃciently high, infant mortality increases in fractionalization, and when a level of fractionalization
is suﬃciently high, infant mortality is lower. Therefore, the coeﬃcient of fractionalization (β1)
is expected to be positive, and the coeﬃcient of its squared term (β2) is expected to be negative.
Finally, in the case of prediction (P3), which states that a rise in fractionalization increases mortality
under a dictatorship, the coeﬃcient of fractionalization (β) is expected to be positive. If using life
28expectancy as a dependent variable, the expected signs of the coeﬃcient of fractionalization are
opposite to those in the case of mortality.
4.2 Data
The data used in our estimations are drawn from various databases. Our dataset is created from
the annual data for 154 countries. The data of infant mortality, child mortality, and life expectancy
is derived from the World Development Indicators provided by World Bank (2010b). Although the
data on infant and child mortality are available in every year since 2005 in most countries, these
data are available only in every ﬁve years before 2005. To ensure data consistency, we employ all
the data for every ﬁve years between 1960 and 2005.
The data of ethnic fractionalization are obtained from Alesina et al. (2003). They create
ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization for approximately 190 countries, mainly based on
the information available for the early to mid-1990s.17 A fraction of each group for calculating
fractionalization is also available from the authors’ website.
Regarding other control variables, real GDP per capita and total population are taken from the
Penn World Table 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009). The data of government expenditures are obtained
from the World Development Indicators provided by World Bank (2010b). In addition, to control
for an eﬀect of human capital on health outcomes, the average years of secondary schooling created
by Barro and Lee (2010) are employed. The data of incidences of war are obtained from the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conﬂict Dataset developed by Gleditsch et al. (2002) and Harbom and
Wallensteen (2010). We create a dummy variable for war that is equal to one if there are at least
1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year and zero otherwise. Furthermore, we control for the
malaria ecology index developed by Kiszewski et al. (2004). A larger value for this index means
that malaria is more likely transmitted due to ecological factors. Regional dummies are constructed
based on the World Bank’s regional classiﬁcation. The detailed deﬁnitions and sources of all the
17Fearon (2003) also creates ethnic and cultural fractionalization for about 160 countries. However, since the number
of countries in the dataset developed by Alesina et al. (2003) is larger than that by Fearon (2003), this paper employs
the data developed by Alesina et al. (2003).
29data are summarized in Table A2 in Appendix B. Descriptive statistics of each variable are shown
in Table A3 in Appendix B.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Democracy with a Dominant Group
Table 1 presents the estimation results for prediction (P1), which insists that an increase in frac-
tionalization worsens health outcomes in the case of a democracy with a dominant ethnic group.
In column (1), where GDP per capita, regional dummies, and year dummies are controlled for,
the coeﬃcient of fractionalization on infant mortality is signiﬁcantly positive, as predicted by our
theoretical model. This result holds in column (2) even if we add additional control variables. From
column (2), while an increase in population signiﬁcantly decreases infant mortality, the impact
of other control variables is not statistically signiﬁcant. In columns (3) and (4), we utilize child
mortality instead of infant mortality as the dependent variable. The signs and signiﬁcances of the
estimated coeﬃcients are the same as those in the case of infant mortality.
[Table 1 here]
Columns (5) and (6) present the results when life expectancy is used as the dependent variable.
By noting that, unlike infant and child mortality, a higher value in life expectancy means better
health condition, the coeﬃcient of fractionalization is expected to be negative from our theoretical
model. Although columns (5) and (6) show that the estimated coeﬃcient of fractionalization is not
statistically signiﬁcant, it is negative as predicted in our theoretical model.
For a robustness check, Table 2 illustrates the results when the size of a dominant ethnic group,
instead of fractionalization, is an explanatory variable of interest. The correlation coeﬃcient between
the size of a dominant ethnic group and fractionalization is −0.984, indicating a negative correlation
between them. Therefore, the signs of the estimated coeﬃcient of a fraction of a dominant group
are expected to be opposite to those of fractionalization in Table 1. The results in Table 2 support
our theoretical prediction, which suggests that a decrease in the size of a dominant ethnic group
30worsens health outcomes in the case of a democracy with the existence of a dominant ethnic group.
The size of a dominant group has signiﬁcant impacts not only on infant and child mortality, but
also on life expectancy.
[Table 2 here]
4.3.2 Democracy without a Dominant Group
Table 3 presents the estimation results in the case of a democracy without a dominant ethnic
group. Prediction (P2) implies the inverted U-shaped relationship between fractionalization and
mortality and the U-shaped relationship between fractionalization and life expectancy. In order to
capture these relationships, we consider the term of fractionalization and its squared term. When
the dependent variable is infant or child mortality, our theoretical model predicts that β1 and β2 are
positive and negative respectively, and a calculated turning point of fractionalization is within the
sample range from 0 to 1. In column (1) and (2), where the dependent variable is infant mortality,
the coeﬃcients of fractionalization and its squared term are signiﬁcantly positive and negative
respectively. Based on the result in column (2), a calculated turning point of fractionalization is
0.791. Therefore, the inverted U-shaped relationship between infant mortality and fractionalization
is conﬁrmed. Let us brieﬂy examine some examples to illustrate this relationship, using the data in
2005. Speciﬁcally, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Ecuador, and Peru are considered to be countries
that have lower fractionalization and lower infant mortality. Fractionalization in Guyana, Trinidad
and Tobago, Ecuador, and Peru is 0.619, 0.648, 0.655, and 0.657, and infant mortality is 32.9,
31.1, 23.5, and 25.5, respectively. Next, countries that are close to the turning point and have
extremely high infant mortality are Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone. Fractionalization in Guinea-
Bissau and Sierra Leone is 0.808 and 0.819, and infant mortality is 121.1 and 134.2, respectively.
Finally, countries that have much higher fractionalization but lower infant mortality are Kenya and
Madagascar. Fractionalization in Kenya and Madagascar is 0.859 and 0.879, and infant mortality
is 59.3 and 49.7, respectively. These concrete examples support the inverted U-shaped relationship
31between fractionalization and infant mortality, as expected in our theoretical model.
[Table 3 here]
Columns (3) and (4) show the results when the dependent variable is child mortality. The
inverted U-shaped relationship between child mortality and fractionalization is also supported. In
columns (5) and (6), life expectancy is used as the dependent variable. In this case, our theoretical
model predicts the U-shaped relationship between life expectancy and fractionalization. The eﬀects
of fractionalization and its squared term are negative and positive respectively. In addition, a
calculated turning point of fractionalization is within the range from 0 to 1 in all columns. These
ﬁndings support our theoretical prediction (P2).
4.3.3 Dictatorship
Table 4 illustrates the estimation results of the relationship between health and fractionalization
in the case of a dictatorship. Our theoretical prediction (P3) suggests a positive relationship be-
tween fractionalization and mortality and a negative relationship between fractionalization and life
expectancy. Columns (1) and (2) report the results in the case of infant mortality, and columns (3)
and (4) illustrate the results in the case of child mortality. Columns (1) and (3) indicate that the
eﬀect of fractionalization is signiﬁcantly positive. However, in columns (2) and (4), where several
variables are controlled for, fractionalization does not have a signiﬁcant impact on infant and child
mortality. A possible explanation for this result is that the eﬀect of government expenditures is
excessively evaluated. This is because the coeﬃcient of fractionalization is signiﬁcant if we exclude
government expenditures in columns (2) and (4). In dictatorial countries, corruption is a serious
problem, and government revenues may be embezzled and/or used ineﬃciently.
In columns (5) and (6), the estimation results are presented in the case of life expectancy as
the dependent variable. The eﬀects of fractionalization on life expectancy are signiﬁcantly negative
in column (5). Although column (6) reports the insigniﬁcance of fractionalization, the sign of its
estimated coeﬃcient is negative. These results also support the negative relationship between life
32expectancy and fractionalization, as suggested by prediction (P3).
[Table 4 here]
4.3.4 Robustness Analysis
In the empirical analysis so far, a fraction of people who care for the whole society (σ) has been
assumed to be negligibly small. However, in reality, more people may care about the whole society.
Therefore, assuming that σ is equal to 0.2, we conﬁrm the robustness of our main results. In this
case, a dominant group exists if a fraction of the most populous ethnic group is above 0.625. Table
5 shows the estimation results in a democracy with a dominant group. The number of countries
categorized in this subsample is 69. The speciﬁcations in Table 5 are similar to those in Table 1. In
columns (1) to (4), where infant mortality and child mortality are used as the dependent variable,
the eﬀect of fractionalization is signiﬁcantly positive, as in Table 1. However, in the case of life
expectancy in columns (5) and (6), the coeﬃcients of fractionalization are negative but are not
statistically signiﬁcant.
[Table 5 here]
Next, Table 6 presents the estimation in a democracy without a dominant group. In this case, a
fraction of the most populous ethnic group is less than 0.625, and 45 countries are included in this
subsample. Our main result holds in the case of infant mortality and child mortality in columns (1)
to (4). The eﬀects of fractionalization and its squared term are signiﬁcantly positive and negative,
respectively. In the case of life expectancy in columns (5) and (6), the coeﬃcients of fractionalization
and its squared term have expected signs but are not statistically signiﬁcant.
In sum, in this robustness check, when infant mortality and child mortality are used as health
outcomes, our main result is supported. On the other hand, the eﬀects of fractionalization on
life expectancy have expected signs but are not statistically signiﬁcant. This result may be at-
tributed from the fact that while infant and child mortality reﬂects the health status of the poor,
33life expectancy captures the “average” health condition in a county as a whole.18
[Table 6 here]
Finally, we conﬁrm the validity of our speciﬁcation as further robustness checks. We conduct
the estimation using fractionalization (the size of a dominant group) and its squared terms for
testing predictions (P1) and (P3) and using only the fractionalization term for testing prediction
(P2). In the case of predictions (P2) and (P3), these terms do not have signiﬁcant impacts. In the
case of prediction (P1), fractionalization and its squared terms have signiﬁcant eﬀects on infant and
child mortality in some speciﬁcations. However, these terms do not have signiﬁcant impacts on life
expectancy, and the size of a dominant group and its squared terms do not have signiﬁcant impacts
on health outcomes. Therefore, we can conclude that our results are robust.
5 Concluding Remarks
Many previous studies ﬁnd that ethnic diversity aﬀects the public goods provision. Also, political
regimes are known to inﬂuence the quality of public policy. However, few studies analyze the
relationship between ethnic diversity, political regimes, and the quality of public policy. This paper
investigates the eﬀects of ethnic diversity on the quality of public policy in diﬀerent political regimes
from both theoretical and empirical viewpoints.
Theoretically, we build a model based on the citizen-candidate model. Our model assumes in-
dividuals with heterogeneous policy preferences and considers how ethnic diversity aﬀects selection
of a politician and the resulting policy choice in a democracy and a dictatorship. Empirically, we
examine the following three hypotheses obtained from our theoretical model. First, in a democ-
racy with a dominant group, an increase in ethnic fractionalization decreases the social welfare.
Second, in a democracy without a dominant group, an increase in ethnic fractionalization has a
non-monotonic eﬀect on the social welfare. Speciﬁcally, when fractionalization is not suﬃciently
18Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley (2011), who empirically examine the eﬀect of electoral institutions on health status,
report a similar result. They show that the impact of institutions on life expectancy is smaller than that on infant
mortality because infant mortality can be improved more easily and less costly than adult mortality.
34high, the social welfare becomes worse as fractionalization increases. When fractionalization rises
to a suﬃciently high level, the social welfare is enhanced. Finally, in a dictatorship, an increase in
ethnic fractionalization decreases the social welfare. We employ the health outcomes as the proxy
for social welfare resulted from public policy. The regression analysis using the data of 154 countries
from 1960 to 2005 supports these three hypotheses. These results are obtained in almost all cases
in which infant mortality, child mortality, and life expectancy is used as health outcomes.
Finally, we note a few caveats regarding our results. First, the model of this paper does not
consider coalition formation among ethnic groups. The relationship between ethnic diversity and
coalition among ethnic groups is studied in Fern´ andez and Levy (2008). Second, in the empirical
analysis, we assume that the fraction of people who care for the whole society (σ) is the same in
all countries. This assumption does not necessarily reﬂect the reality and σ may be diﬀerent across
countries. Investigating the determinants of a fraction of people who care for the whole society and
its eﬀects on public policy are promising topics of future research. Third, while we treat political
institutions as exogenous, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) discuss the possibility that political institu-
tions are endogenously determined through intergroup conﬂicts. The analysis on the interaction
between ethnic composition and political institutions can lead to further understanding of the re-
lationship between ethnic diversity, political regime, and public policy. Despite these caveats, our
results provide an insightful explanation of the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and
public policy.
Appendix A. Theoretical Appendix
Democracy with Equal Group Size under Assumptions 1 and 3
We consider the case of a democracy with equal group size. While we made Assumptions 2 and 3
in Section 3.2.3, we replace Assumption 2 with Assumption 1 in this appendix. Under Assumptions
1 and 3, there are two possible equilibria other than the one-candidate equilibrium where a type s
individual runs for election.
35The ﬁrst one is an N-candidate equilibrium where each group turns out one type e candidate.
This equilibrium is the same as the N-candidate equilibrium in Proposition 3, but the necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for existence of the equilibrium are diﬀerent. Under Assumptions 1 and 3,















When Assumption 2 is replaced with Assumption 1, it is possible that a type s individual does not
run for an election even if there are only type e candidates and the type s individual can certainly
win the election if running for the election. Thus, condition (12) in Proposition 3 is modiﬁed to
condition (A.2). Note that both conditions (A.1) and (A.2) are hard to hold, as N is large. The
property that the N-candidate equilibrium disappears when N is suﬃciently large is preserved in
this case.
The second one is an M-candidate equilibrium (M < N) where the M candidates are type e

















− δ ≤ 0, (A.4)






When there are M (< N) type e candidates from diﬀerent groups, a type s individual can win
the election certainly if running for the election. For this M-candidate equilibrium to exist, it is
necessary that running for election does not pay type s individuals, and condition (A.5) assures it.
Condition (A.3) means that it is optimal for the type e candidates to run for election. Condition
(A.4) means that no more type e individuals want to run for election, given that there are M type
36e candidates from diﬀerent groups. From (A.3) and (A.4), the equilibrium number of candidates
M must satisfy M ≤ (NT)
α /δ ≤ M + 1. When N is suﬃciently large, condition (A.5) does not
hold. In this case, the welfare loss due to the policy by a type e politician is very large, and it is
suboptimal for a type s individual to let a type e candidate win the election.
From the above argument, even if Assumption 2 is replaced with Assumption 1, we can see that
the equilibrium where a type e individual becomes a politician does not exist when N is suﬃciently
large. When N is not suﬃciently large, there is the equilibrium where a type e individual becomes
a politician, and large N leads to large welfare loss due to the policy by a type e politician as
discussed in Section 3.2.3.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5 includes two claims, and we divide the proof into two parts to prove them separately.
(i) We ﬁrst show that an M-candidate equilibrium exists where each major group turns out one
type e candidate if and only if both conditions (16) and (17) hold.
Proof. The proof of the necessity is very similar to that of Proposition 3. We prove by contradiction
that, if an M-candidate equilibrium exists where each major group turns out one type e candidate,
then both conditions (16) and (17) must hold. Assume that condition (16) does not hold. Then, it
is suboptimal for the type e candidates to run for election. It is a contradiction. Next, assume that
condition (17) does not hold. Then it is suboptimal for a type s individual not to run for election.
It is a contradiction. Therefore, if an M-candidate equilibrium exists where each major group turns
out one type e candidate, then both conditions (16) and (17) must hold.
We next show that, if conditions (16) and (17) hold, an M-candidate equilibrium exists where
each major group turns out one type e candidate. To show this, we will show that, when the pool of
candidates comprises M type e individuals from diﬀerent major groups, each individual’s decision
on whether to run for election is optimal given the other individuals’ decisions. From (16), it is
optimal for the candidate to run for election. When M = 1, since δ > 0 and υ = 0, it is optimal
37for other type e individuals of the major group not to run for election. When M ≥ 2, if another
type e individual in a major group runs for election, the two candidates in this major group will
certainly lose. Thus, it is optimal for other type e individuals in the major groups not to run for
election. From (17), given that M type e individuals from diﬀerent major groups run for election, a
type s individual will lose with probability one if running for election, and it is optimal not to run
for election. When there is a type e candidate of the major group, a type e candidate of the small
group loses with probability one. This is because the number of type e individuals in the major
group is larger than that in the small group and type s individuals prefer a type e candidate of the
major group to a type e candidate of the small group. Thus, it is optimal for type e individuals of
the small groups not to run for election. Therefore, an M-candidate equilibrium exists where each
major group turns out one type e candidate.
(ii) We next show that there is no other equilibrium than the one-candidate equilibrium where a
type s individual runs for election and the M-candidate equilibrium where each major group
turns out one type e candidate.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that the one-candidate equilibrium where a type s individual runs for election
is the only equilibrium where a type s individual runs for election.
Since a type e candidate of the small group can never beat a type e candidate of the major
group, the pool of candidates that includes both a type e candidate of the small group and a type e
candidate of the major group cannot be an equilibrium. Therefore, we have to check the following
two cases:
(a) the pool of candidates comprises a type s individual and some type e individuals of the major
groups.
(b) the pool of candidates comprises a type s individual and some type e individuals of the small
groups.
38To show a contradiction, assume that the pool of candidates in case (a) constitutes an equilib-
rium. Then, all major groups must turn out one type e candidate since, if not, the type s candidate
will win certainly. In such a case, however, from Assumption 3a, either the type s candidate or the
type e candidates will certainly lose, and there are some candidates whose choices are not optimal.
This is a contradiction, and case (a) cannot be an equilibrium.
In case (b), while the type e candidates obtain votes from type e individuals of their own group,
the type s candidate obtains votes of all individuals other than type e individuals of the small
groups which turn out the type e candidates. This means that the type e candidates will lose with
probability one and their strategy is not optimal. Thus, case (b) cannot be an equilibrium, and the
one-candidate equilibrium where a type s individual runs for election is the only equilibrium where
a type s individual runs for election.
Next, we show that the M-candidate equilibrium where each major group turns out one type e
candidate is the only equilibrium where there is no type s candidate. To show this, we must show
that the following two cases cannot be an equilibrium:
(a) the pool of candidates comprises only type e individuals in the small groups.
(b) the pool of candidates comprises only type e individuals in the major groups, and there are
some major groups that do not turn out a candidate.
In case (a), if a type s individual runs for election, he/she can win with probability one. Thus,
from Assumption 2a, it is suboptimal for a type s individual not to run for election, and case (a)
cannot be an equilibrium. Similarly, a type s individual can certainly win an election if running for
election in case (b), and case (b) cannot be an equilibrium. Therefore, the M-candidate equilibrium
where each major group turns out one type e candidate is the only equilibrium where there is no
type s candidate.
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44Table 1: Health and fractionalization in democracy with a dominant group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Infant mortality Child mortality Life expectancy
Fractionalization 0.317** 0.307* 0.334** 0.311** -0.028 -0.034
(0.149) (0.156) (0.153) (0.155) (0.019) (0.020)
GDP per capita -0.774*** -0.751*** -0.819*** -0.793*** 0.096*** 0.091***
(0.044) (0.046) (0.047) (0.045) (0.008) (0.008)
Government expenditure -0.008 -0.006 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001)
Education -0.033 -0.034 0.006
(0.034) (0.035) (0.004)
Population 0.054*** 0.062*** -0.009***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.003)
War 0.085 0.083 -0.002
(0.110) (0.121) (0.019)
Malaria ecology -0.013 -0.007 -0.002
(0.015) (0.016) (0.003)
Sub-Saharan 0.470*** 0.671*** 0.589*** 0.759*** -0.097*** -0.091***
Africa dummy (0.112) (0.165) (0.121) (0.170) (0.025) (0.031)
Latin America and 0.426*** 0.402*** 0.420*** 0.404*** 0.013 0.008
Caribbean dummy (0.076) (0.085) (0.077) (0.084) (0.012) (0.012)
Constant 9.763*** 9.256*** 10.377*** 9.747*** 3.377*** 3.525***
(0.435) (0.515) (0.461) (0.497) (0.080) (0.075)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.79 0.82
No. of countries 85 80 85 80 85 80
Observations 504 478 504 478 511 483
Note: Infant mortality, child mortality, life expectancy, GDP per capita, and population are in the
natural logarithm. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of signiﬁcance levels,
respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at country level.
45Table 2: Health and the size of a dominant group in democracy with a dominant group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Infant mortality Child mortality Life expectancy
Dominant group -0.396** -0.374* -0.416** -0.373* 0.045* 0.050*
(0.190) (0.189) (0.200) (0.193) (0.024) (0.027)
GDP per capita -0.775*** -0.754*** -0.820*** -0.797*** 0.096*** 0.091***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.045) (0.008) (0.008)
Government expenditure -0.008 -0.006 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001)
Education -0.031 -0.031 0.006
(0.034) (0.034) (0.004)
Population 0.053** 0.062*** -0.009***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.003)
War 0.092 0.089 -0.003
(0.110) (0.121) (0.019)
Malaria ecology -0.014 -0.007 -0.002
(0.016) (0.016) (0.003)
Sub-Saharan 0.477*** 0.683*** 0.596*** 0.772*** -0.097*** -0.092***
Africa dummy (0.113) (0.167) (0.122) (0.173) (0.025) (0.032)
Latin America and 0.429*** 0.406*** 0.424*** 0.409*** 0.014 0.008
Caribbean dummy (0.075) (0.083) (0.077) (0.083) (0.012) (0.012)
Constant 10.188*** 9.675*** 10.823*** 10.169*** 3.335*** 3.476***
(0.427) (0.520) (0.446) (0.499) (0.077) (0.073)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.91 0.79 0.82
No. of countries 85 80 85 80 85 80
Observations 504 478 504 478 511 483
Note: Infant mortality, child mortality, life expectancy, GDP per capita, and population are in the
natural logarithm. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of signiﬁcance levels,
respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at country level.
46Table 3: Health and fractionalization in democracy without a dominant group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Infant mortality Child mortality Life expectancy
Fractionalization 54.065*** 39.338*** 60.775*** 45.582*** -9.921*** -8.101**
(12.706) (7.059) (12.384) (6.931) (2.804) (3.155)
Fractionalization squared -35.119*** -24.880*** -39.549*** -29.029*** 6.439*** 5.333**
(8.081) (4.699) (7.923) (4.612) (1.805) (2.055)
GDP per capita -0.589*** -0.354*** -0.657*** -0.404*** 0.091*** 0.065***
(0.109) (0.046) (0.100) (0.041) (0.010) (0.020)
Government expenditure -0.007 -0.007 0.003
(0.009) (0.008) (0.003)
Education -0.330*** -0.337*** 0.028
(0.082) (0.079) (0.019)
Population 0.064* 0.086** 0.009
(0.037) (0.034) (0.013)
War 0.208** 0.150* 0.007
(0.079) (0.085) (0.016)
Malaria ecology 0.003 0.009* -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Sub-Saharan 0.502 0.383 0.658** 0.527** -0.190*** -0.172***
Africa dummy (0.321) (0.257) (0.300) (0.218) (0.046) (0.029)
Latin America and 0.729** 0.808*** 0.753** 0.887*** -0.081** -0.050
Caribbean dummy (0.329) (0.188) (0.313) (0.169) (0.039) (0.041)
Constant -12.171** -8.820*** -13.866*** -10.716*** 7.195*** 6.502***
(4.795) (2.639) (4.685) (2.599) (1.070) (1.125)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.81 0.91 0.85 0.93 0.80 0.82
No. of countries 29 24 29 24 29 24
Observations 109 91 109 91 115 95
Note: Infant mortality, child mortality, life expectancy, GDP per capita, and population are in the
natural logarithm. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of signiﬁcance levels,
respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at country level.
47Table 4: Health and fractionalization in dictatorship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Infant mortality Child mortality Life expectancy
Fractionalization 0.293* 0.362 0.375** 0.408 -0.088* -0.042
(0.173) (0.233) (0.187) (0.247) (0.046) (0.044)
GDP per capita -0.353*** -0.341*** -0.396*** -0.375*** 0.066*** 0.057***
(0.051) (0.080) (0.053) (0.083) (0.011) (0.012)
Government expenditure -0.012 -0.012 0.002*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.001)
Education -0.136 -0.165* 0.035***
(0.089) (0.094) (0.013)
Population -0.011 -0.007 0.010
(0.041) (0.044) (0.007)
War 0.026 0.014 -0.040
(0.110) (0.122) (0.035)
Malaria ecology -0.014 -0.011 0.001
(0.012) (0.013) (0.003)
Sub-Saharan 0.347*** 0.398* 0.503*** 0.517** -0.151*** -0.148***
Africa dummy (0.107) (0.213) (0.116) (0.225) (0.032) (0.039)
Latin America and 0.063 0.047 0.077 0.065 0.024 0.023
Caribbean dummy (0.184) (0.169) (0.195) (0.175) (0.032) (0.023)
Constant 6.761*** 7.088*** 7.367*** 7.628*** 3.584*** 3.488***
(0.417) (0.795) (0.439) (0.861) (0.098) (0.155)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.68 0.68 0.72 0.68 0.73
No. of countries 107 81 107 81 109 82
Observations 595 417 595 417 638 433
Note: Infant mortality, child mortality, life expectancy, GDP per capita, and population are in the
natural logarithm. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of signiﬁcance levels,
respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at country level.
48Table 5: Robustness analysis on health and fractionalization in democracy
with a dominant group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Infant mortality Child mortality Life expectancy
Fractionalization 0.463** 0.414* 0.482** 0.453** -0.018 -0.037
(0.226) (0.230) (0.223) (0.215) (0.033) (0.032)
GDP per capita -0.797*** -0.761*** -0.838*** -0.804*** 0.097*** 0.089***
(0.049) (0.054) (0.051) (0.052) (0.009) (0.009)
Government expenditure -0.007 -0.006 -0.002*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
Education 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.040) (0.038) (0.004)
Population 0.060** 0.067*** -0.013***
(0.023) (0.020) (0.003)
War 0.136 0.130 -0.007
(0.107) (0.119) (0.019)
Malaria ecology 0.035* 0.038* -0.008**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.004)
Sub-Saharan 0.477*** 0.540*** 0.542*** 0.589*** -0.091*** -0.083**
Africa dummy (0.116) (0.139) (0.133) (0.148) (0.030) (0.032)
Latin America and 0.367*** 0.438*** 0.348*** 0.422*** 0.020 0.000
Caribbean dummy (0.090) (0.110) (0.090) (0.107) (0.015) (0.015)
Constant 9.961*** 9.144*** 10.547*** 9.660*** 3.371*** 3.598***
(0.472) (0.626) (0.496) (0.587) (0.089) (0.087)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.91 0.77 0.81
No. of countries 69 64 69 64 69 64
Observations 423 397 423 397 429 401
Note: Infant mortality, child mortality, life expectancy, GDP per capita, and population are in the
natural logarithm. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of signiﬁcance levels,
respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at country level.
49Table 6: Robustness analysis on health and fractionalization in democracy
without a dominant group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Infant mortality Child mortality Life expectancy
Fractionalization 12.817** 11.017** 14.608** 12.927*** -1.053 -1.019
(6.270) (4.102) (6.554) (4.268) (1.179) (0.979)
Fractionalization squared -8.435* -7.317** -9.769** -8.749*** 0.676 0.702
(4.300) (2.933) (4.513) (3.044) (0.879) (0.751)
GDP per capita -0.575*** -0.497*** -0.637*** -0.544*** 0.083*** 0.065***
(0.077) (0.057) (0.072) (0.057) (0.009) (0.012)
Government expenditure -0.014** -0.014** 0.003**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002)
Education -0.162*** -0.172*** 0.020**
(0.037) (0.040) (0.008)
Population 0.011 0.019 0.009*
(0.026) (0.024) (0.005)
War 0.080 0.035 0.003
(0.069) (0.088) (0.013)
Malaria ecology -0.015** -0.012 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002)
Sub-Saharan 0.538*** 0.638*** 0.744*** 0.814*** -0.178*** -0.175***
Africa dummy (0.197) (0.152) (0.196) (0.157) (0.031) (0.026)
Latin America and 0.565*** 0.454*** 0.598*** 0.487*** -0.021 -0.004
Caribbean dummy (0.120) (0.101) (0.123) (0.108) (0.016) (0.015)
Constant 3.498 3.995*** 3.648 3.930** 3.870*** 3.815***
(2.454) (1.404) (2.500) (1.454) (0.410) (0.308)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.85 0.91 0.87 0.92 0.82 0.84
No. of countries 45 40 45 40 45 40
Observations 190 172 190 172 197 177
Note: Infant mortality, child mortality, life expectancy, GDP per capita, and population are in the
natural logarithm. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% of signiﬁcance levels,











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































52Table A3: Descriptive statistics
Variables Observations Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Infant mortality 154 1208 63.039 48.682 2.200 217.900
Child mortality 154 1208 95.005 83.061 2.900 417.900
Life expectancy 154 1264 61.279 11.701 29.100 81.925
Fractionalization 154 1264 0.466 0.263 0 0.930
Dominant group 154 1264 0.647 0.242 0.178 1
GDP per capita 154 1264 8312 10462 153 97813
Government expenditure 151 1119 15.287 6.659 2.736 63.778
Education 131 1113 1.669 1.309 0.014 7.468
Population 154 1264 33788 116697 169 1306314
War 154 1264 0.052 0.223 0 1
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